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ABSTRACT
The operational and policy complexity of civil- military 
relations (CMR) during public health emergencies, espe-
cially those involving militaries from outside the state 
concerned, is addressed in several guiding international 
documents. Generally, these documents reflect human-
itarian perspectives and doctrine at the time of their 
drafting, and primarily address foreign military involve-
ment in natural and humanitarian disasters. However, 
in the past decade, there have been significant changes 
in the geopolitical environment and global health land-
scapes. Foreign militaries have been increasingly deployed 
to public health emergencies with responses grounded 
in public health (rather than humanitarian) approaches, 
while public health issues are of increasing importance in 
other deployments. This paper reviews key international 
policy documents that regulate, guide or otherwise inform 
CMR in the context of recent events involving interna-
tional CMR during public health emergency responses, 
grounded in analysis of a March 2017 Chatham House 
roundtable event on the subject. Major thematic concerns 
regarding the application of existing CMR guiding docu-
ments to public health emergencies became evident. 
These include a lack of consideration of public health 
factors as distinct from a humanitarian approach; the 
assertion of state sovereignty vis-à-vis the deployment of 
national militaries; the emergence of new armed, military 
and security groups and a lack of consensus surrounding 
the ’principle of last resort’. These criticisms and gaps—in 
particular, a consideration for public health contexts and 
approaches therein—should form the basis of future CMR 
drafting or revision processes to ensure effective, safe, 
and sustainable CMR during public health emergency 
response.
INTRODUCTION
Civil- military relations (CMR), especially those 
involving militaries from outside the state 
concerned, are guided and informed by various 
United Nations (UN) guidelines, frameworks and 
policy papers which have evolved incrementally 
since the 1990s. They generally address the role 
of international militaries in natural disasters; are 
international in flavour, rather than focusing on 
the use of national militaries and are written from 
a humanitarian perspective reflecting the primary 
international concern of the early post- Cold War 
period. Their relevance in a changed environment 
is thus questionable, especially where militaries 
are increasingly responding alongside civilian 
responders to non- conflict public health emergen-
cies such as Ebola or COVID-19. Nonetheless, 
UN CMR guiding documents are still relied on to 
inform and critique CMR during these events.
This paper assesses the appropriateness of the 
current UN CMR guiding documents for the use 
of militaries in responding to health challenges and 
concludes with recommendations to inform future 
revision.
METHODS
The focus of this paper is on those UN policy—
what we term ‘guiding documents’—in the context 
of both international and national uses of militaries 
in public health emergencies.
Key UN policy documents that regulate, guide or 
otherwise inform CMR were reviewed. Although 
there are myriad CMR guiding documents and 
policies from agencies such as Médecins Sans Fron-
tiers, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) and various military bodies (eg, the USA, 
the UK and North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 
because of their centrality in defining CMR policy 
this review focuses on three documents from within 
the UN system (Table 1). These documents do not 
represent the full spectrum of CMR in the human-
itarian community. However, they do represent the 
three core, consensus- driven and global guiding 
documents that have been adopted and accepted 
by the UN for wide international consideration and 
applicability (while part of the ‘core four’ UN CMR 
guiding documents, this analysis does not consider 
the 2013 Inter- Agency Standing Committee (IASC) 
Non- Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed 
Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys. This is because 
the document addresses the use of armed escorts for 
Key messages
 ► Global guiding documents that inform civil- 
military relations (CMR) in humanitarian crises 
have not kept abreast of recent geopolitical 
changes.
 ► In particular, the applicability of CMR guiding 
documents during public health emergencies 
(as distinct from natural disaster response 
guided by standard humanitarian principles) is 
unclear.
 ► Gaps are evident—consideration must be given 
to the changing international environment, 
state sovereignty, new armed groups and the 
principle of last resort.
 ► CMR guiding documents should be reviewed on 
this basis in order to appropriately inform future 
CMR during public health emergencies.
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humanitarian convoys specifically, rather than providing guiding 
principles for CMR in humanitarian settings more generally).
Core thematic similarities and distinctions between these 
documents were mapped to identify the historical and polit-
ical contexts that informed their development, as well as the 
operational contexts they seek to inform. The outcome was 
then considered in the context of global events and conversa-
tions surrounding CMR during recent public health emergen-
cies and draws on a March 2017 Chatham House roundtable 
event and report in which we were observer participants.1 
Roughly 50 participants attended from military, international (I) 
non- governmental organisation(NGO), governmental, UN and 
academic backgrounds, with representation from high- income, 
middle- income and low- income countries.
Criticisms of existing CMR guiding documents for public 
health emergency response raised during the roundtable were 
synthesised and explicated to identify gaps which were then used 
to identify key considerations that should inform future CMR 
policy documents.
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT: REVIEWING THE CMR POLICY 
GEOGRAPHY
The civil- military regulatory domain is complex but comprises 
five broad groupings of policies specific to CMR2:
1. General guidance on CMR.
2. Guidelines related to a specific emergency.
3. Guidelines on particular elements of CMR.
4. Guidelines relating to specific bilateral arrangements.
5. Intragovernmental arrangements.
Most of the documents that concern international military deploy-
ments fall in group 1 and appear to assume the deployment of a 
Global North military to the Global South. Several key UN guide-
lines form the basis of most strategic discussion regarding CMR at 
the international level. Specifically, the UN Office for the Coordi-
nation of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) maintains three sets of 
guiding documents as mentioned in Table 1.
The historical and political grounding of each are therefore 
briefly outlined, followed by an analysis of the general themes 
shared between the documents.
The IASC Reference Paper
The Inter- Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Reference Paper 
(2004) is arguably the most comprehensive of OCHA’s guide-
lines, complementing the earlier guidelines and providing guid-
ance for the maintenance of humanitarian principles.3 It argues 
for the maintenance of the civilian character of humanitarian 
assistance, the use of military as a ‘last resort’ and a clear divi-
sion of labour wherever possible.4 Starting from this position 
of ‘difference’, the IASC Reference Paper recognises that both 
civilian and military groups may ‘pursue common goals… 
(using) basic strategies (that) range from coexistence to coop-
eration’ alongside the ‘shared responsibility’ of coordination 
(Figure 1).3 5 6
While the IASC Reference Paper reaffirms the significance of 
the humanitarian principles (namely humanity, neutrality, impar-
tiality and independence), it is relatively pragmatic in their appli-
cation, recognising that a humanitarian imperative ‘may at times 
necessitate a pragmatic approach’ to CMR.3 However, the IASC 
Reference Paper contains further principles that limit the contri-
butions of military, stipulating that military relief activities are 
‘by their nature and definition, not “humanitarian”’.3
Key elements of these principles are listed in Box 1.2
The MCDA Guidelines
The Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) Guidelines were 
adopted in 1994 by consensus and revised in 2007. They were 
developed at the request of OCHA and the International Feder-
ation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in response 
to civil- military interaction in emergencies in the early 1990s, 
such as the Spitak, Armenia Earthquake (1988) and Operation 
‘Provide Comfort’ in northern Iraq (1991–1996). The guidelines 
provide a model legal framework for the utilisation of MCDA in 
humanitarian contexts, and address situations such as man- made 
and environmental disasters in times of peace (Box 2).
They are intended to establish ‘the basic framework for 
formalising and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the use of military teams and expertise in international disaster 
relief’.7 Unlike the Oslo Guidelines, the MCDA Guidelines 
presume a viable host state or government, and also provide 
civil- military guidance in contexts of peace- enforcement and 
combat (Figure 2).8
The Oslo Guidelines
The Oslo Guidelines, developed in 1994, underpin most global 
policies and ‘were intended to establish principles and standards 
that would improve (the) coordination and use of military and 
civil defence assets in response to natural, technological and 
environmental emergencies in peacetime’.5 Emerging under the 
auspices of the Consultative Group on Humanitarian Civil- 
Military Coordination, they enjoy a unique status of being 
internationally agreed and IASC- endorsed and are the ‘leading 
international instrument concerning the role of militaries in the 
response to natural disasters’.9
Key elements of the Oslo Guidelines are mentioned in Box 3.
General themes shared among the guiding documents
These guiding documents are consistent in emphasising compli-
ance with two humanitarian (rather than public health) princi-
ples: they emphasise action based on impartial needs assessments, 
free from discrimination; and the use of military assets only as 
a ‘last resort’. They discourage dependency, encourage maximal 
civilian operational independence and control and advocate 
distinction between military and civilian activities. These prin-
ciples should be maintained, even if they may circumstantially 
disadvantage beneficiaries. They are intended to regulate inter-
national third- party interventions and do not address the conse-
quences of a host nation taking a different view. Health is placed 
within a broader humanitarian context, rather than defining 
public health emergency contexts.
A related and recurring theme is that associating civilian organ-
isations with military bodies may undermine civilian humani-
tarian activity and endanger the safety of civilian personnel.10 
This is particularly relevant in conflict environments when 
Table 1 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs guidelines on civil- military coordination
Last revision Short title Long title
2004 IASC Reference 
Paper
Civil- Military Relationship in Complex 
Emergencies
2006 MCDA Guidelines Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil 
Defence Assets to Support United Nations 
Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies
2007 Oslo Guidelines Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and 
Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief
IASC, Inter- Agency Standing Committee.
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civilians might be considered parties to the conflict.10 In such 
circumstances, CMR guiding documents suggest complete sepa-
ration through co- existence.
However, even in complex emergencies, the delivery of aid by 
a military body may be legally or ethically mandated: the Office 
of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees’ Guidelines cites 
Geneva Convention IV and the requirement for an occupying 
power to ‘supply food and medicine’ and ‘maintain hospitals, 
and public health and hygiene’.11 Consequently, the IASC argues 
that guidance must be ‘balanced by sound pragmatism’.10
A CHANGING POLICY GEOGRAPHY: DISCUSSION AND 
RESULTS
While key guiding documents offer a relatively consistent 
position regarding the role of militaries, their practicability is 
increasingly challenged. Experiences in countries like Haiti, 
Myanmar, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq ‘have all demon-
strated continuing weaknesses in civil- military coordination’.12 
Furthermore, ‘military and humanitarian actors have consis-
tently failed to reach a common understanding of the role that 
each plays, the challenges they face and, critically, the priority 
needs of affected populations and how these can or should be 
addressed’.12
Crucially, the guidelines have not yet considered five imbri-
cating complexities, which were all raised at the 2017 Chatham 
House roundtable, namely:
 ► The changing international environment.
 ► Civil- military public health emergency responses.
 ► The assertion of state sovereignty and voice.
 ► Non- military armed groups that are partner to CMR.
 ► A lack of consensus on the ‘principle of last resort’.
These core issues are discussed in turn in the context of the UN 
CMR guiding documents, in order to robustly explicate these 
omissions and their consequences.
Figure 1 Civil- military coordination scenarios.
Box 1 Summary of IASC core principles
The use of military assets is a last resort, and the ‘military should 
avoid direct assistance unless it is the only way of providing life- 
saving assistance’.10
The civilian nature of humanitarian assistance must be 
retained wherever possible.
The ‘distinction’ between humanitarian assistance and military 
roles in security and relief must be maintained.
The ‘military and civil defence assets of belligerent forces 
engaged in combat shall not be used to support humanitarian 
activities’.10
‘Request for the use of military assets must be made by the 
(UN) Humanitarian (or) Resident Coordinator’.10
The ‘use of MCDA should be planned to be limited in time, and 
include a clear exit strategy’. This is ‘in order to avoid creating 
dependency on military support’.10
Countries providing ‘should respect the UN codes of conduct 
and humanitarian principles’.10
‘As a general rule, humanitarian convoys will not use armed or 
military escorts’.10
Box 2 Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) 
definition
MCDA (as defined in the 1994 Oslo Guidelines) includes 
‘relief personnel, equipment, supplies and services provided 
by foreign military and civil defence organisations for 
international humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, “civil 
defence organisation” means any organisation that, under the 
control of a Government, performs the functions enumerated in 
Article 61, paragraph (1), of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949’.17
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The changing international environment
The IASC Guidelines establish four mission scenarios (Figure 2), 
with differing policy frameworks that shape CMR and are 
adapted to the specific circumstances, mandates and rules of 
engagement of military actors.5 However, the scenarios raises a 
number of issues, both in terms of the categorisation of conflict, 
the actors that are addressed by the frameworks and the propen-
sity for operational environments to experience substantive and 
dynamic political changes over the course of a protracted public 
health emergency compared with a natural disaster.10
The reality rarely matches the IASC’s scenarios. For example, 
the 2004 Aceh Tsunami response placed humanitarians alongside 
a host- nation military that was both a responder to the crisis and 
an active participant in a counterinsurgency, akin to UN peace 
enforcement troops in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo responding to the ongoing Ebola outbreak there. These 
responses pose peculiar but increasingly common challenges: one 
force can be simultaneously subject to a mandate that bridges the 
IASC Guideline’s ‘peaceful’ and ‘conflict’ mission contexts, posing 
significant challenges for humanitarian organisations. One recent 
typology found six unique operational spaces that CMR can exist 
within and between, including iterations of CMR across and even 
outside the mission contexts described in Figure 2.13
The guidelines also predate the increasing role of international 
militaries engaged in governmentally endorsed development 
work, for example, the United States Africa Command provision 
of militarised assistance in conflict- prone areas which are also 
subject to natural disasters. In this area of quasi- war, frequent 
humanitarian emergencies and state fragility, positioning human-
itarian responders in relation to troops is inadequately addressed 
by existing guidelines.
Civil-military public health emergency responses
The failure to address public health factors or emergencies is 
a crucial omission and was consistently raised at the 2017 
Chatham House roundtable.1 Humanitarian responses in the 
1980s and 1990s generally involved assistance to states that 
lacked significant public health infrastructure. Responses were 
generally limited to basic and temporary life- sustaining assis-
tance such as evacuations or the provision of trauma care and 
food packages. However, increasingly assistance is to states 
which have developed infrastructure essential to public health 
(eg, power, water, communication and sanitation) with popula-
tion public health interventions (eg, immunisations and environ-
mental interventions to interrupt parasitic infections). There is 
also the emergence of ‘pure’ infectious disease emergencies, such 
as the 2013–2016 West Africa Ebola Epidemic and the ongoing 
COVID-19 outbreak.
The response to such emergencies includes the maintenance 
or repair of essential infrastructure, securing or initiating public 
health programmes and repairing or constructing new health-
care, laboratory and quarantine/isolation facilities.
The breadth of this support requires a cross- sectoral 
approach, including health, security, economy, education and 
infrastructure. No one organisation can provide all components, 
and foreign and domestic militaries have become increasingly 
involved in supporting various health- related response elements 
such as coordination, logistics, information management, 
Figure 2 Applicability of the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs guidelines. MCDA, Military and Civil Defence 
Assets.
Box 3 Key principles of the Oslo Guidelines
‘Last resort’: ‘foreign military and civil defence assets should be 
requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative, 
and only when the use of foreign military or civil defence assets 
can meet a critical humanitarian need. The foreign military or 
civil defence asset must therefore be unique in capability and 
availability’.17
Foreign military and civil defence assets should ‘be seen as 
a tool complementing existing relief mechanisms in order to 
provide specific support to specific requirements, in response to 
the acknowledged “humanitarian gap”’.26
Military and civilian defence assets ‘can be mobilised and 
deployed bilaterally or under regional or alliance agreements 
as “other deployed forces” or as part of a United Nations 
operation as “UN MCDA”. All disaster relief… should be 
provided at the request or with the consent of the Affected State 
and, in principle, on the basis of an appeal for international 
assistance’.17
All relief actions ‘remain the overall responsibility of the 
(Affected) State and are complemented by a foreign (military 
or civil defence force) operating (bilaterally or) within an 
international relief effort’.7
‘Distinction’: military personnel should be unarmed, but 
remain in military uniform.
Foreign military and civil defence assistance ‘should be 
provided at no cost to the Affected State, unless otherwise 
agreed between concerned States or as regulated by 
international agreements’.17
‘An Assisting State deciding to employ its (military and civil 
defence assets) should bear in mind the cost/benefit ratio of 
such operations as compared to other alternatives, if available. 
In principle, the costs involved in using (military and civil defence 
assets) on disaster relief missions abroad should be covered by 
funds other than those available for international development 
activities’.17
‘As a general principle, UN humanitarian agencies must avoid 
becoming dependent on military resources and Member States 
are encouraged to invest in increased civilian capacity instead 
of the ad hoc use of military forces to support humanitarian 
actors’.17
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laboratories and communications, or through tactical interven-
tions by helping secure or supply quarantines, hosting isolation 
facilities or providing armed escorts for civilian response workers. 
Crucially, this support is often provided over a sustained period 
of time, rather than temporary relief in response to a singular 
natural disaster, involving both militaries and NGOs. Many 
public health NGOs do not strictly adhere to humanitarian prin-
ciples, instead choosing context- specific alignment with them. 
For example, the NGO GOAL Global provided accommodation 
and facilities to British military troops in the 2013–2016 West 
Africa Ebola Epidemic. This diversity of position is reflected by 
many non- UN guidelines: many are concerned with minimising 
civil- military overlap, some with maximising co- operation and 
some on addressing specific issues.2
There are ongoing efforts to develop appropriate frame-
works that consider public health emergencies, including one 
by WHO, but this is neither published nor tested, and leaves 
significant gaps by not addressing the array of non- medical 
components of a public health emergency response (eg, logis-
tics or coordination) that a military may support. UN OCHA 
has published a two- page document on understanding UN- CM-
Coord documents during COVID-19, but is extremely brief and 
ad hoc: it does not constitute core CMR guidance.14 At best, 
this reflects a diversity of position and opinion. At worst, this 
represents ‘inconsistent and contradictory’ stances.5 In short, 
‘while simultaneously calling for respect for humanitarian prin-
ciples, in the recent past many humanitarian organisations have 
also willingly compromised a principled approach in their own 
conduct through close alignment with… military activities and 
actors’.15 This may have been necessary, but is not addressed in 
guidelines.
The assertion of state sovereignty and voice
The guiding documents are silent on how to align the UN’s 
mandate to support national governments and the common 
leadership or inclusion of a host nation’s health authorities in 
responding to an emergency when foreign militaries are involved 
alongside domestic military and security services.
The Oslo Guidelines in particular apply to foreign militaries, 
providing no guidance on relations with domestic militaries, 
despite being ‘one of the most problematic (CMR) areas…, 
particularly (in) a conflict in which the domestic military are a 
party’.9 In such contexts, several dominant civil- military norms 
such as ‘last resort’ are inappropriate or inapplicable, especially 
in contexts where partnerships between foreign and domestic 
militaries exist pre- crisis, or when military support is requested 
by the sovereign host nation, such as in Sierra Leone’s Ebola 
response.16 Host- nation requests for military support are partic-
ularly problematic to CMR in an environment including a 
civilian response where the state authority is military.
The legitimacy of the CMR guiding documents are also under-
mined as the original drafting of the Oslo and MCDA Guide-
lines included only one sub- Saharan African country between 
them.7 17 There is therefore a real risk that the guidelines are 
(or are viewed as) a western construct imposing humanitarian 
norms on ex- colonies or in inappropriate contexts and ignores 
the increasing assertion of state sovereignty. This issue was raised 
by a number of participants from lower- income and middle- 
income countries at the Chatham House roundtable. Militaries 
were also excluded, and the guidelines thus enjoy only limited 
recognition among global militaries. Furthermore, the principle 
of co- production with potential beneficiaries is notably absent. 
This calls into question the guiding documents’ relevance to 
many nations, including those at high risk of experiencing public 
health emergencies.
Other unaddressed military and security groups
Existing international guiding documents also fail to address 
numerous other armed groups, such as civil protection and 
defence groups, private security companies (PSCs) and non- 
state armed groups (NSAGs). This is particularly problematic 
when addressing infectious disease outbreaks which requires a 
response which involves all actors.
Civil protection and civil defence groups
The IASC Global Health Cluster Paper (2011) highlights the 
absence of an internationally agreed definition of civil defence or 
civil protection actors relationship(s) with host- nation military 
forces.10 The profusion of definitions and the increasing reliance 
on these actors as humanitarian responders has created a need to 
redefine and reconsider where these fit within the CMR context. 
Guiding documents should also address ‘where these are civilian 
actors explicitly operating on the basis of humanitarian princi-
ples’ such as with some police and gendarmerie.10
Private security companies
PSCs are increasingly involved in protecting humanitarian staff 
and facilities, have an increasingly role supporting military 
forces and are increasingly ubiquitous. Where acceptance, ‘low 
profile’, and remote programming strategies have failed or are 
deemed inappropriate, some humanitarian agencies ‘have opted 
for a deterrence model using armoured vehicles, fortifying offices 
and hiring armed security’.5 One estimate suggests that all major 
international humanitarian organisations have used armed PSCs 
at least once.5 The guiding documents do not address how 
Box 4 Recommendations
Identify appropriate actor(s) and convene a high- level 
conference, possibly hosted by the Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs, with a view to reviewing existing civil- 
military guiding documents collectively, rather than addressing 
revision processes guideline by guideline.
Consider new guidelines or frameworks that specifically 
address the deployment of a foreign military to a public health 
emergency response, as distinct from a natural or sudden- 
onset disaster response, or identify ways of adapting existing 
guidelines that can accommodate these contexts; ensure this 
takes the changing international environment into account.
Alternatively, consider the development of a set of principles 
against which civil- military cooperation can be planned and 
assessed for each specific operation and intervention, in lieu of 
relying on guidelines to inform all civil- military activities.
Adapt civil- military guideline terminology and make it more 
flexible, so that it can accommodate the fluid environments and 
contexts in which protracted public health emergencies unfold.
Identify and address military, security and other armed groups 
not covered in existing international guiding documents.
Revisit the principle of ‘last resort’, to provide and include 
a more nuanced understanding that includes considerations 
weighed against the humanitarian imperative.
Ensure maintenance of civilian leadership in humanitarian 
activities, but consider military involvement as part of a 
multisectoral approach.
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civilian organisations can appropriately relate to PSCs in public 
health contexts.11
Non-state armed groups
NSAGs are increasing in numbers and some control territory 
where civilian and humanitarian organisations operate. Histor-
ically, relationships between civilian groups and NSAGs were 
limited to issues surrounding humanitarian access, but some 
NSAGs are themselves providers of health and relief assistance, 
such as the so- called Islamic State’s health services, and direct 
support to NSAGs has occurred in some relief efforts.16 Rela-
tions with NSAGs is complicated by difficulties in identifying 
the boundary between NSAGs and crisis- affected community 
leadership. Civilian actors are increasingly engaging with these 
groups but doing so is fraught with ethical challenges and legal 
risks exacerbated by developments in counterterrorism legis-
lation, international sanctions, money laundering regulations 
and domestic legislation which at times contradict international 
humanitarian law.18 Importantly, militaries involved in public 
health emergency response may have a concurrent mandate 
to deter or combat NSAGs, complicating CMR for both mili-
tary and civilian organisations operating across both domains. 
Matters are further complicated by the proliferation and dyna-
mism of NSAGs and by occasional and often temporary alliances 
between militaries and some of these groups. While detailed 
guidance may be difficult to develop, nonetheless, it is a signifi-
cant gap which means that current arrangements are ad hoc and 
legally questionable.
The principle of last resort and the humanitarian imperative
While a recurring theme of guidelines is that of military only 
as a ‘last resort’, there remain differences between practice and 
reality, not least because in sudden- onset emergencies, mili-
taries (domestic and foreign) are often first responders simply 
because they can deploy quickly and the humanitarian need 
exceeds civilian capabilities. Civilian organisations may be 
poorly prepared or equipped, or they may choose not to inter-
vene for reasons of cost, risk or politics, or capacity.19 There-
fore, compliance with the principle of ‘last resort’ may preclude 
military support to crisis- affected populations when it is the 
most practicable, exigent and life- saving resource available. The 
issue is compounded by ambiguity and confusion in guideline 
language and interpretation. For example, when guidelines state 
that ‘military and civil defence assets of belligerent forces engaged 
in combat shall not be used to support humanitarian activities’,7 
they appear to contradict Geneva Convention responsibilities.
Incorporating the principle of ‘last resort’ into national 
doctrine also differs. For example, Canada and the UK have 
national CMR guidelines directly informed by the Oslo Guide-
lines, while Belgium, the Netherlands and the USA’ CMR 
policies are not, unless requested by OCHA.20 This ambiguity 
is also reflected in humanitarian positions. At the 30th Inter-
national Conference of ICRC (2007), the Guidelines for the 
Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster 
Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance (the ‘IDRL Guidelines’) 
were adopted. These suggested that ‘military assets should be 
deployed for disaster relief or initial recovery assistance only at 
the request of and with the express consent of the affected state, 
after comparable civilian alternatives have been considered’.21 
This is a weaker position than ‘last resort’, and is a divergence 
from the humanitarian absolutism of the 1990s, even if it is a 
limited and reluctant embrace.
The principle of last resort is further complicated by the mech-
anisms for triggering the deployment of military resources. In 
theory, on the request of a disaster- affected state, a UN Disaster 
Assessment and Coordination team deploys to conduct an initial 
needs assessment, including an evaluation for the prospect of 
military support. However, states, UN agencies and other organ-
isations ‘routinely choose alternative means for channelling 
military assets’.5 Thus, even requests made through the correct 
channels may not consider CMR arrangements. This is further 
complicated in areas of NSAG control, where a Humanitarian or 
Resident Coordinator holds no practical authority. More chal-
lenging is the finding that many key stakeholders are unaware 
of the guiding documents: for example, one evaluation of the 
response to the 2004 Aceh Tsunami found that very few actors—
civilian or military—knew of the guidelines, and that ‘some 
“humanitarian actors” by their actions appeared unaware of even 
the basic concerns regarding association with military forces’.22
Any globally focused guideline will have limited relevance 
without significant consensus between concerned groups and 
actors and there is a compelling need to challenge the powerful 
institutions of humanitarian governance to incorporate other 
voices in discussions over principles such as ‘last resort’. Ulti-
mately, the principle is arguably impracticable in the dynamic 
and urgent context of a rapid onset disaster, nor during the 
fluidity and unpredictability of a protracted public health emer-
gency. Furthermore, it is impracticable when myriad military 
and security groups intervene with or without invitation, or as 
deployed by a host- nation government. This reality has largely 
been accepted by governments and militaries and is increasingly 
recognised and accommodated among international organisa-
tions (IOs) and NGOs.
CONCLUSION
At times, the existing guidelines, frameworks and guides offer 
duplicating, imbricating or conflicting guidance; at others, they 
do not adequately address existing or probable CMR in the 
context of a health emergency; neither have they kept pace with 
geopolitical developments. As such, while existing guidelines, 
frameworks and guides provide utility in many circumstances, 
none are consistently satisfactory. The myriad CMR guiding 
documents produced independently by other agencies and 
militaries do address some of these concerns, but nevertheless, 
the UN CMR guidelines should, but do not, represent cogent, 
consistent and aligned principles for CMR in the international 
arena.
While the guiding documents struggle to appropriately 
address the new challenges of CMR, their existence undoubtedly 
serves a purpose, as they should provide a common platform 
for humanitarian positions. There is evidence of the guidelines 
beginning to shape the strategic cultures of IOs, including within 
the UN and European Union which has committed to adherence 
to the MCDA guidelines, and has affirmed that its ‘capacities 
must be deployed in a way compatible with the work of human-
itarian organisations’.23
However, these processes will remain inadequate for public 
health emergencies unless the criticisms and gaps of existing 
UN guiding documents are addressed including the lack of non- 
Western or military voices in the documents’ drafting process; 
the difficulty adhering to some humanitarian principles in an 
increasingly dynamic and complicated space; a lack of consid-
eration for the increasing assertion of state sovereignty or for 
different professional and regional cultures; geopolitical devel-
opments including the increase in NSAGs and legal developments 
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such as in counterterrorist legislation and the confusing, overlap-
ping nature of the guidelines themselves.1 Specific consideration 
is required for public health emergencies as a distinct phenom-
enon and consideration for various relevant actors. These gaps 
are compounded by a poor consensus regarding the ‘principle of 
last resort’, a lack of awareness or understanding of the guide-
lines by key actors, and by the proliferation of specifically public 
health emergencies.
Existing UN guiding documents must either be revised, or new 
documents created, which include public health requirements. 
While the 2018 IASC Recommended Practices for Effective 
Humanitarian Civil- Military Coordination of Foreign Military 
Assets in Natural and Man- Made Disasters represents an attempt 
to create new and practicable guidance, it still does not centrally 
consider or address any of these issues.24 Given the increasing 
complexity and frequency of situations that involve concurrent 
civilian and armed- actor responses, a viable alternative may 
be to move away from guideline or guideline- type documents 
altogether, and to identify a set of internationally agreed prin-
ciples against which civil- military cooperation can be planned 
and assessed for each specific operation and intervention. Devel-
oping principles may also overcome the argument that seeking 
to revise international documents that took significant effort 
and compromise to develop is a major and perhaps inadvisable 
process. UN OCHA’s October 2014 briefing document Civil- 
Military Interaction and the Use of Foreign Military and Civil 
Defence Assets (MCDA) in the Context of the Ebola Crisis in 
West Africa is short, does not include a number of the gaps iden-
tified here, and is limited to only one operational context, but 
does indicate that the agency is prepared to address their global 
guidance according to new developments and concepts.25 Simi-
larly, while only two pages long and therefore extremely nascent 
in development and adoption, their March 2020 briefing docu-
ment on CMR during COVID-19 ‘considers lessons observed 
from the SARS outbreak in 2002–2003 and the Ebola outbreak 
of 2014, among others’ and is therefore further promising indi-
cation of willingness to substantively engage this discussion.14
In short, while it is inevitable that this complicated space will 
remain controversial and key elements of CMR guidelines will 
remain contested, it is crucial that these criticisms and gaps are 
considered and addressed in future CMR guideline and frame-
work dialogue, revisions and development.
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